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Torts-RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION Is NOT BARRED BY DOCTRINE OF
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN FLORIDA-Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825
(Fla. 1977).
On January 20, 1973, an accident occurred involving a vehicle
owned by Sweet & Blossom, Inc. and operated by Gerald Paoli and
a vehicle owned and operated by Minnie Shor. David Shor, Min-
nie's husband and a passenger in her car, was injured in the colli-
sion. Sweet & Blossom, Inc. sued Minnie Shor for the damages
allegedly caused by negligent operation of her automobile. Mrs.
Shor filed a counterclaim against Paoli for damages resulting from
his alleged negligence. Intervening in the action, David Shor sought
recovery for his injuries from Paoli. The jury found Paoli sixty-five
percent at fault and Mrs. Shor thirty-five percent at fault, awarding
David Shor $12,000 in damages against Paoli, Sweet & Blossom,
Inc., and the company's insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Com-
pany.
On August 22, 1974, Paoli filed a complaint in the Broward
County Circuit Court seeking contribution from Mrs. Shor as a joint
tortfeasor under section 768.31, Florida Statutes.' He asked for fifty
1. (1977). Section 768.31 provides:
(1) SHORT TITLE.-This act shall be cited as the "Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act."
(2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION.-
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for
the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though
judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid
more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is
limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is
compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liabil-
ity.
(c) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intention-
ally (willfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death.
(d) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrong-
ful death is not extinguished by the settlement or in respect to any amount paid in
a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
(e) A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the
liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer
is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it
has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability. This
provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other
relationship.
(f) This act does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. When
one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity
obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not
entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
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percent of the $12,000 judgment, which he had previously satisfied.,
Circuit Judge L. Clayton Nance denied Paoli's request for contribu-
(g) This act shall not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.
(3) PRO RATA SHARES.-In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in
the entire liability:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability.
(b) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute
a single share.
(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
(4) ENFORCEMENT.-
(a) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more
tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by
separate action.
(b) When a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfea-
sors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that
action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants, by motion
upon notice to all parties to the action.
(c) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor
seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be
commenced within 1 year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for
appeal or after appellate review.
(d) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor
seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either:
1. Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limita-
tions period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has com-
menced his action for contribution within 1 year after payment, or
2. Agreed, while action is pending against him, to discharge the common liabil-
ity and has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his
action for contribution.
(e) The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one
tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the
injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of the
judgment does not impair any right of contribution.
(f) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defen-
dante to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among
such defendants in determining their right to contribution.
(5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE-When a release or a covenant
not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more
persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury
or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in
the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribu-
tion to any other tortfeasor.
(6) UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION.-This act shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states that enact it.
(7) PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION.-This act shall apply to all causes of
action pending on June 12, 1975, wherein the rights of contribution among joint
tortfeasors is [sic] involved and to cases thereafter filed.
2. Appellants' Brief at 3, Paoli v. Shor, 345 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Paoli
amended his complaint on August 19, 1975, naming Allstate Insurance Company, Mrs. Shor's
insurer, as an additional defendant. Id. at 1.
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tion from Mrs. Shor, citing the doctrine of interspousal immunity
as a bar. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida 3
reversed the circuit court and certified the question at issue to the
Florida Supreme Court.' The supreme court held that the doctrine
of interspousal immunity does not bar contribution from a joint
tortfeasor who is the spouse of the injured party.5
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by the 1975 Florida
Legislature,' Florida did not allow contribution among joint tortfea-
sors.7 Instead, Florida adhered to the longstanding common law rule
against contribution among joint tortfeasors, which originated in
England in 1799 in Merryweather v. Nixan.5 In Merryweather, the
court denied contribution between joint tortfeasors because the act
in question was a willful and malicious joint wrong.' American
courts eventually expanded the rule in Merryweather to include not
only cases of willful and malicious joint conduct, but also cases in
which the independent negligence of two or more persons caused a
single harm.'0
The following statement by the Florida Supreme Court aptly
summarizes the reasons why the legislature abolished the tradi-
tional rule against contribution and adopted the right of contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors:
There is no equitable justification for recognizing the right of the
plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of fault
while denying the right of fault allocation as between negligent
defendants. Courts in other states which have receded from the
doctrine of no contribution have emphasized the unfairness and
injustice of placing the entire burden upon the ofie who happens
to be called upon to pay the entire damages where such payment
3. Paoli v. Shor, 345 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
4. 345 So. 2d at 790. The question certified was:
DOES THE COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY
CONTROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORT-
FEASORS ACT (75-108 LAWS OF FLORIDA, SECTION 768.31, FLORIDA
STATUTES) TO PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING A CON-
TRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER TORT-
FEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PERSON WHO RECEIVED
DAMAGES FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR?
Id.
5. Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1977).
6. FiA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977).
7. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
8. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
9. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather
v. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. Rlv. 176, 179 (1898).
10. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS § 50, at 306 (4th ed. 1971).
19791
170 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:167
should in justice be shared by another who shared the responsibil-
ity for the injury."
According to the 1975 Act, the following requirements must be
met for the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors to attach:
two or more persons must be jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to a person;" a tortfeasor must have paid more than his
pro rata share of the common liability;" and the recovery must be
limited to the amount paid by a tortfeasor in excess of his pro rata
share of the common liability. 4 Additionally, the tortfeasor must
not have intentionally caused or contributed to the injury.'
Shortly after the adoption of the Act, the First District Court of
Appeal, in Mieure v. Moore,'6 specifically denied contribution from
a joint tortfeasor whose spouse and children were the injured par-
ties, holding that the doctrine of family immunity precluded com-
mon liability. In Mieure, a car driven by Moore and occupied by his
family struck a parked tractor-trailer. Moore alleged that the
tractor-trailer was negligently parked and sought damages for the
injuries he and his family had sustained. The owners of the tractor-
trailer counterclaimed for contribution from Moore for his pro rata
share of any damages they might have to pay Moore's family.
The Mieure court held that under Florida law neither Moore's
wife nor his children could sue him in tort for the injuries they had
sustained in the accident. The court reasoned that because Moore
was not liable to his family in tort, common liability did not exist
between Moore and the owners of the tractor-trailer, so the owners
could not seek contribution from Moore. However, the court did
express some degree of dissatisfaction with this result and stated,
"the time may be ripe for the abrogation of the family immunity
doctrine. It appears that this would be consistent with the recent
development that a loss should be apportioned among those whose
fault contributed to the event, as well as providing for contribution
among joint tortfeasors."17
The Florida Supreme Court in Paoli did not reach the issue of
family immunity; it did abrogate the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity as a bar to contribution among joint tortfeasors. The court's
ruling was premised on several points adopted from the district
11. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391 (Fla. 1975).
12. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) (1977).
13. Id. § 768.31(2)(b).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 768.31(2)(c).
16. 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
17. Id. at 547.
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court's earlier decision in the case. These points require a more
extensive examination than that afforded by the supreme court's
opinion.
The district court-and apparently the supreme court as
well-observed that the doctrine of interspousal immunity is based
on a desire to protect the family unit. Since the contribution Paoli
sought from Mrs. Shor did not threaten the stability of the Shor
family unit, it would be illogical in this instance for the doctrine of
interspousal immunity to control over section 768.31. Paoli was not
asking Mrs. Shor to sue Mr. Shor. He was asking only that he be
relieved of the obligation to pay Mrs. Shor's pro rata share of Mr.
Shor's judgment. Since it was not a direct suit between husband
and wife, the court reasoned that no harm was done to the doctrine
of interspousal immunity.'"
Additionally, the district court noted that the purpose of contri-
bution among tortfeasors is to apportion, among the negligent tort-
feasors, the burden of payment to innocent injured third parties.
The burden of payment to an innocent injured third party (Mr.
Shor) would not have been apportioned if Mrs. Shor had not been
required to pay her pro rata share. Thus the purpose of the Act could
only be fulfilled by allowing Paoli to obtain contribution from Mrs.
Shor.'1
The court reasoned that it would be unfair for Paoli to pay for all
of Mr. Shor's injuries when Mrs. Shor was partially responsible for
them. As Judge James C. Dauksch, Jr. said for the majority, "[t]o
say that Shor doesn't have to contribute and account for her
wrongdoing would be unfair to Paoli and a windfall to Shor."'
Chief Judge Mager wrote a specially concurring opinion and
noted that the Florida Legislature could have excepted the doctrine
of interspousal immunity from the application of contribution, as it
had excepted fiduciary obligations in section 768.31(2)(g). "' Chief
Judge Mager also pointed out that the right to contribution appeals
to one's sense of justice, especially when the interspousal immunity
is viewed in the modern-day setting.22
District Judge Alderman dissented from the majority position in
Paoli, believing the court had diluted the doctrine of interspousal
immunity. Judge Alderman stated that it was within the power of
the Florida Supreme Court, not the district court, to make such a
18. 345 So. 2d at 790.
19. Id. See Frier's, Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 355 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
20. 345 So. 2d at 790.
21. Id. at 791.
22. Id. (citing a similar case. Zarrella v. Miller. 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966)).
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modification. Judge Alderman also objected to the majority's hold-
ing because Mrs. Shor and Mr. Paoli had no common liability to
Mr. Shor since the doctrine of interspousal immunity precluded Mr.
Shor from asserting a claim against his wife.13
In affirming the district court decision in Paoli the Florida Su-
preme Court did not consider relevant cases from other jurisdic-
tions, most notably the seventeen other states which already had,
at the time of the Paoli decision, adopted the Act.2" Because the
purpose of uniform laws, 25 of which the Act is one, is to make state
laws uniform in certain areas, it is surprising that the court did not
ask whether a uniform, majority view has emerged in other states
which have adopted the Act. Apparently the court's decision was
founded more on a desire for equity than on a desire for uniformity.
As of January 1, 1979, nineteen states had adopted the Act.2"
Contribution is allowed in at least fifteen additional states, pur-
suant to case law or statutes similar to the Act. 27 Those states that
have adopted the Act require a common liability to the injured
party for the right of contribution to attach.2s Many states which
23. 345 So. 2d at 791.
24. The eighteen states that had adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act at the time of the Paoli decision were Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee. Wyo-
ming has since adopted the Act. 12 UNIFoam LAws ANN. Contribution Among Tortfeasors § 1
(Supp. 1979).
25. The Act is one of 22 Uniform Acts relating to civil procedure and remedial laws drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and recommended for
adoption in all states. Id. at iii-iv.
26. See note 24 supra.
27. Cases showing adoption of contribution though not under the Act, in these 15 states
are: Texas, Ft. Worth & Den. Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1955); Virginia,
American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 218 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1954); New York,
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); District of Columbia,
Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Louisiana, Shannon v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 532 (W.D. La. 1945); Alabama, Vandiver v. Pollak, 19 So.
180 (Ala. 1895); California, Augustus v. Bean, 363 P.2d 873 (Cal. 1961); Georgia, Eidson v.
Maddox, 24 S.E.2d 895 (Ga. 1943); Iowa, Wright v. Haskins, 260 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1977);
Kentucky, Elpers v. Kimbel, 366 S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1963); Michigan, Caldwell v. Fox, 231
N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 1975); Minnesota, Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 161 N.W.2d 657 (Minn.
1968); Missouri, State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 213 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1948); West
Virginia, Haynes v. City of Nitro, 240 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1977); Wisconsin, Farmers Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1959).
28. Cases showing the requirement of common liability in several states that have adopted
the Act: South Dakota, Highway Constr. Co. v. Moses, 483 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1973);
Tennessee, Hill v. United States, 453 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1972); Delaware, Ici America, Inc. v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 368 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Del. 1974); Rhode Island, Rowe v. John C.
Motter Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363 (D.R.I. 1967); Arkansas, Cox v. Maddux, 255 F.
Supp. 517 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Hawaii, Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 707
(D. Hawaii 1947); Maryland, Ennis v. Donovan, 161 A.2d 698 (Md. 1960); New Jersey, Clare
v. Fliegel, 180 A.2d 404 (N.J. Cape May County Ct. 1962); New Mexico, Beal v. Southern
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allow contribution through case law or statute other than the Act
also impose this requirement.29 Common liability exists when multi-
ple tortfeasors are each liable to the injured party.3
The common law doctrine of interspousal immunity has either
been completely or partially abolished in at least twenty-seven
states.3' Nine of these states have adopted the Act.3 2 Of the states
which have adopted the Act and which have at least partially abro-
gated interspousal immunity, at least one-New Jersey3-expressly
permits contribution from a tortfeasor who is the spouse of the in-
jured party.
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, which have adopted the Act,
allow contribution from a tortfeasor who is the spouse of the injured
Union Gas Co., 304 P.2d 566 (N.M. 1956); North Carolina, Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Surratt, 200 S.E.2d 220 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973); Pennsylvania, Brown v. Dickey, 155 A.2d 836
(Pa. 1959).
29. Cases showing the requirement of common liability as a prerequisite to the right of
contribution in several states that allow contribution though not pursuant to the Act: Texas,
Ft. Worth & Den. Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1955); New York, American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Georgia, Eidson v. Maddox, 24 S.E.2d
895 (Ga. 1943); Iowa, Wright v. Haskins, 260 N.W.2d 536 (Iowa 1977); Kentucky, Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Griffin Constr. Co., 280 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955); Michigan, Caldwell v.
Fox, 231 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 1975); Minnesota, Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 161 N.W.2d 657
(Minn. 1968); Wisconsin, Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 99
N.W.2d 746 (Wis. 1959).
30. 18 Am. Jum. 2d Contribution §§ 7-8 (1965).
31. Cases showing complete or partial abrogation of interspousal immunity: Alabama,
Bonner v. Williams, 370 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1966); Colorado, McSwain v. United States, 291
F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Alaska, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alas. 1968);
Arkansas, Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957); California, People v. Pierce, 395 P.2d
893 (Cal. 1964); Connecticut, Menczer v. Menczer, 280 A.2d 875 (Conn. 1971); Idaho, Rogers
v. Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho 1975); Indiana, Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d
794 (Ind. 1972); Kentucky, Layne v. Layne, 433 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1968); Louisiana, Gremillion
v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. Ct. of App. 1954); Massachusetts, Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d
526 (Mass. 1976); Michigan, Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1965); Minnesota,
Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969); Nevada, Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013
(Nev. 1974); New Hampshire, Lundberg v. Hagen, 316 A.2d 177 (N.H. 1974); New Jersey,
Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970); New Mexico, Flores v. Flores, 506 P.2d 345 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1973); North Carolina, Jernigan v. Jernigan, 72 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. 1952); North
Dakota, Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 242 N.W. 526 (N.D. 1932); Oklahoma, Courtney v.
Courtney, 87 P.2d 660 (Okla. 1938); South Carolina, Algie v. Algie, 198 S.E.2d 529 (S.C.
1973); South Dakota, Scotvold v. Scotvold, 298 N.W..266 (S.D. 1941); Vermont, Richard v.
Richard, 300 A.2d 637 (Vt. 1973); Virginia, Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971);
Washington, Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972); Wisconsin, Haumschild v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959); New York, N.Y. GEN. OauG. LAw § 3-313
(McKinney 1978). See also Mosier v. Carney, 138 N.W.2d 343 (Mich. 1956); Casey, The
Trend of Interspousal and Parental Immunity-Cakewalk Liability, 45 INS. CoUNsmL J. 321
(1978). See generally Note, Interspousal Immunity in Tort: Its Relevance, Constitutionality,
and Role in Conflict of Laws, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 484 (1969).
32. Alaska, Arkansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and South Dakota.
33. Immer v. Risko, 267 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1970).
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party despite retention of interspousal immunity. In essence, this
is the Florida position after Shor v. Paoli. For this reason, it seems
odd that the Florida Supreme Court did not mention or discuss the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Fisher v. Dieh135 or the
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision in Zarrella v. Miller.3
The facts of Fisher v. Diehl were almost identical to those in
Paoli. Mr. Fisher's automobile, in which his wife was a passenger,
collided with Diehl's truck. Diehl sought to have Mr. Fisher made
an additional defendant in order to protect his right to contribution
if a judgment were entered against him. The court reasoned that
"[t]he legal unity of husband and wife and the preservation of
domestic peace and felicity between them are desirable things to
maintain where they do not produce injustice to the wife and where
they do not inflict injustice upon outsiders and deprive them of their
legal rights." 37 The court allowed Diehl contribution from Mr.
Fisher. The court noted that the judgment against the tortfeasor
spouse was not enforceable by the injured spouse and did not inure
to the benefit of the injured spouse, but rather to the benefit of the
nonspouse joint tortfeasor 8
The facts and outcome in Zarrella were also substantially similar
to those in Paoli. The Rhode Island Supreme Court based its hold-
ing on a belief that a joint tortfeasor is a joint tortfeasor regardless
of the relationship between the tortfeasor and the injured party.
Therefore, the court concluded, justice requires a joint tortfeasor-
spouse to contribute as any other joint tortfeasor would.3 The
Zarrella court explored the Rhode Island Legislature's intent in
adopting the Act and determined that the interspousal immunity
doctrine was not intended to be an exception to the statute allowing
contribution among tortfeasors. 0
The court reasoned that the doctrine of interspousal immunity is
based upon public policy considerations that do not apply to actions
for contribution. It decided that the term "liable in tort" as used in
the Act means that the culpability of one tortfeasor is not lessened
because that tortfeasor is the spouse of the injured party. Inter-
spousal immunity in Rhode Island is a procedural matter which
does not negate the existence of the cause of action referred to by
the term "liable" in the statute, but merely negates the right to
34. Fisher v. Diehl, 40 A.2d 912 (Pa. 1945); Zarrella v. Miller, 217 A.2d 673 (R.I. 1966).
35. 40 A.2d 912.
36. 217 A.2d 673.
37. 40 A.2d at 917.
38. Id.
39. 217 A.2d at 676.
40. Id.
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enforce that cause of action. 41
After Shor v. Paoli, in Florida, contribution clearly may be sought
from a joint tortfeasor who is the spouse of the injured party despite
the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Although the Florida Su-
preme Court did not state specificallythat section 768.31 will al-
ways control over the doctrine of intrafamily immunity, it seems
clear that it will, especially since the court expressly overruled
Mieure.2 As well as interspousal immunity, Mieure involved the
relationship of intrafamily immunity to contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 3
The holding in Shor v. Paoli is not as clear, however, in regard to
the status of common liability with respect to the right of contribu-
tion. Since the court did not address explicitly the issue of whether
common liability is a prerequisite to the right of contribution, it
cannot be assumed that Florida does not require common liability.
In fact, section 768.31(2)(b) specifically requires that common lia-
bility exist before the right of contribution exists, and current case
law has so construed the statute."
The language in Shor v. Paoli suggests that the Florida court
views common liability as the Rhode Island court did in Zarrella v.
Miller. The issue turns then on whether there is a cause of action,
not on whether the cause of action can be enforced. Thus, Mr. Shor
had a cause of action against Mrs. Shor in negligence that could not
be exercised because of the doctrine of interspousal immunity. With
this in mind, it is clear that common liability and contribution from
the tortfeasor who is the spouse of the injured party can coexist
without damage to either.
In making its decision in this case, the Florida Supreme Court
perhaps should have inquired into the positions of the other states
which have adopted the Act. This would serve the ends of uniform-
ity as well as equity. Despite the court's narrow inquiry, its holding
and the current state of the law after Shor v. Paoli appear both
reasonable and logical. The purpose of contribution, to apportion
the financial responsibility for the injury between the wrongdoers,
is upheld, and since the contribution allowed in Paoli does not per-
mit a direct suit between husband and wife, no real harm is done




42. 353 So. 2d at 826.
43. 330 So. 2d 546.
44. United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 334 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
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